simTPM: User-centric TPM for Mobile Devices (Technical Report) by Chakraborty, Dhiman et al.
simTPM: User-centric TPM for Mobile Devices
(Technical Report)
Dhiman Chakraborty
CISPA Helmholtz Center
for Information Security,
Saarland University
Lucjan Hanzlik
CISPA Helmholtz Center
for Information Security,
Stanford University
Sven Bugiel
CISPA Helmholtz Center
for Information Security
Abstract
Trusted Platform Modules are valuable building blocks for
security solutions and have also been recognized as benefi-
cial for security on mobile platforms, like smartphones and
tablets. However, strict space, cost, and power constraints of
mobile devices prohibit an implementation as dedicated on-
board chip and the incumbent implementations are software
TPMs protected by Trusted Execution Environments.
In this paper, we present simTPM, an alternative imple-
mentation of a mobile TPM based on the SIM card avail-
able in mobile platforms. We solve the technical challenge
of implementing a TPM2.0 in the resource-constrained SIM
card environment and integrate our simTPM into the secure
boot chain of the ARM Trusted Firmware on a HiKey960
reference board. Most notably, we address the challenge of
how a removable TPM can be bound to the host device’s
root of trust for measurement. As such, our solution not
only provides a mobile TPM that avoids additional hardware
while using a dedicated, strongly protected environment, but
also offers promising synergies with co-existing TEE-based
TPMs. In particular, simTPM offers a user-centric trusted
module. Using performance benchmarks, we show that our
simTPM has competitive speed with a reported TEE-based
TPM and a hardware-based TPM.
1 Introduction
Trusted computing technology has become a valuable build-
ing block for security solutions. The most widely deployed
form of trusted computing on end-consumer devices is the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a dedicated hardware chip
that offers facilities for crypto co-processing, protected cre-
dentials, secure storage, or even the attestation of its host
platform’s state. By today, software and system vendors have
built various security solutions on top of TPM. For instance,
Microsoft’s BitLocker uses it to release disk-encryption cre-
dentials only to a trustworthy bootloader [50]; or Google’s
Chromium uses the TPM for a range of objectives [63], such
as preventing software version rollback, protecting RSA
keys, or attesting protected keys.
TPM is also of interest for the different stakeholders on
mobile devices. However, the particular benefits that the
TPM offers have historically hung on the TPM’s implemen-
tation as a dedicated security chip that can act as a ”local
trusted third party” on devices. Mobile devices are, however,
constrained in space, cost, and power consumption, which
prohibits a classical deployment of TPM. To address the par-
ticular problems of the mobile domain, the Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG) introduced the Mobile Trusted Mod-
ule (MTM) specifications [64]. Although the MTM concept
has never left the prototype status, its ideas influenced the
latest TPM2.0 specification [67]. The TPM2.0 mobile ref-
erence architecture [66] proposed different alternatives for
implementing a TPM on a mobile device, including virtu-
alization, dedicated cores, or hardware-based isolation. The
de-facto implementation of mobile TPMs today are protected
environments through hardware-based trusted execution en-
vironment (TEE) [57, 47, 33, 24, 25, 46], like ARM Trust-
Zone that is available on virtually all mobile platforms today,
where the TPM is implemented as protected software appli-
cation inside the TEE.
Given the different proposals for realizing TPMs on mo-
bile platforms, we conduct a systematic comparison of the
different solutions in terms of security of the TPM itself,
their applicability in current systems, and deploy-ability in
the specific setting of mobile devices. While the solutions
naturally differ in their security guarantees for the TPM (i.e.,
TPM state or execution) due to differences in the under-
lying technology (e.g., dedicated hardware chip vs. virtual
machine), we see particularly shortcomings of the current
solutions in terms of applicability and deploy-ability. In
particular, the currently incumbent fTPM (firmware TPM)
is strictly bound to the platform vendors and serves their
purposes (e.g., securing vendor credentials), but is not or
only very limited available to other stakeholders in the sys-
tem, such as the user. Moreover, an fTPM [57] that is
based on a TEE falls short on providing a fully measured
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boot by itself. The availability of an fTPM depends on
the availability of the TEE during boot, which is one of
the last steps in the long boot-chain. In light of recent at-
tacks against mobile bootloaders [58] and trusted software
in TEE [42, 19, 8, 3, 60, 59, 52, 40, 61], this lacking support
to attest the entire, early boot-chain, including the software
in the TEE, is unsatisfactory.
To put a new perspective on solving those issues of fTPM,
we add in this paper an alternative implementation of a
hardware TPM called simTPM to the landscape of mobile
TPM implementations by using the subscriber identity mod-
ule (SIM) card. We have implemented a prototype of our
solution on a Hikey960 reference board [1] and using a
Gemalto Multos card as SIM card. Our simTPM solves
the technical challenge of implementing TPM2.0 compliant
functionality on the SIM card, which does not require any ad-
ditional hardware for the TPM. This approach keeps the costs
down and leverages dormant hardware capabilities of mobile
devices. Through performance tests, we show that simTPM
is competitively fast to reported fTPM implementations. A
particular challenge of this design is the lack of the usual
physical binding between the TPM and its host platform’s
root of trust for measurement (RTM), that is, a SIM card can
be moved to another platform. We discuss two strategies in
the particular setting of mobile devices on how to bind the
simTPM to a device’s RTM, either through an extended se-
cure boot and TEE proxy or through a distance bounding
protocol. Once bound to the device’s RTM, we also in-
tegrated simTPM with the ARM Trusted Firmware (ATF)
boot chain to augment the ATF secure boot with an authenti-
cated boot. Our solution not only fills the gap of TEE-based
TPMs for measured boots, but the co-existence of a fTPM
and simTPM on a mobile device creates also promising syn-
ergies between the two TPMs (e.g., to support multiple stake-
holders). Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
1. A systematic comparison of existing solutions for mo-
bile TPMs and their enabling technologies. We discover
that incumbent solutions fall short on applicability and
deploy-ability aspects.
2. We implemented the first SIM card based TPM2.0 for
mobile devices by developing a simTPM, which can
be executed in this constrained environment. Our so-
lution enables a user-centric trusted module offering a
portable sealed storage.
3. We propose an integration with the on-board TEE to
solve the problem of binding the simTPM to the RTM
and discuss an alternative solution based on distance
bounding. As a result of this binding, a fully measured
boot on the ARM Trusted Firmware (ATF) secure boot
chain is possible.
4. The performance of our simTPM is competitively fast
to a reported fTPM implementation and is comparable
with existing hardware TPMs.
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Figure 1: Trusted Boot Process with TPM; P(#) = boot chain
path; M(#) = measurement of component #
2 Background
We briefly introduce necessary background information
about ARM Trusted Firmware, TPM, and SIM cards.
2.1 ARM Trusted Firmware (ATF)
ATF implements a subset of the trusted board boot require-
ments for ARM reference platform [5]. Figure 1 illustrates
the bootloader settings and boot chain. ATF is triggered
when the platform is powered on. After the primary CPU and
all other CPU cores are initialized successfully, the primary
core triggers the ATF ( P1 ). ATF is divided in five steps de-
pending on modularity: 1 BootLoader stage 1 (BL1) for
AP trusted boot ROM, 2 BootLoader stage 2 (BL2) for
Trusted Boot Firmware, 3 BootLoader stage 3-1 (BL3-1)
for EL3 Runtime Firmware, 4 BootLoader stage 3-2 (BL3-
2) for Secure-EL1 Payload (optional), 5 BootLoader stage
3-3 (BL3-3) for Non-trusted Firmware.
Secure boot: ATF implements a secure boot in which ev-
ery component along the boot chain P# verifies the authen-
ticity and integrity of the next component. Since BL1 does
not have a preceding component, it has to be axiomatically
trusted. Thus, BL1 verifies BL2, BL2 verifies BL3.x, and so
forth. Verification is usually based on certificates, where a
hash of a trusted (vendor) public key is fused into the hard-
ware and is available to BL1 to ensure a trustworthy signa-
ture of BL2. At the end of a successful secure boot, every
component in the boot chain has been checked for integrity
and authenticity before handing control to it. If any verifica-
tion fails, the boot aborts.
2.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
TPM by the Trusted Computing Group is the most wide-
spread trusted computing technology on end-user devices.
By today, the TPM specification is in its version 2.0, ad-
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dressing many of the security issues and practical concerns
of previous versions 1.0–1.2. According to this specification,
a TPM provides a number of desirable hardware and secu-
rity features. It is equipped with secure non-volatile mem-
ory, a set of platform configuration register (PCR) banks, a
processor to run TPM code in isolation, co-processors for
common cryptographic primitives (e.g., RSA, ECC, SHA-1,
SHA-256), a clock, and a random number generator. By de-
fault, a TPM is deployed as a hardware chip soldered onto
a platform’s motherboard. Besides acting as a cryptographic
co-processor, a TPM provides the facilities to securely store
measurement about the host platform’s configuration (e.g.,
software state) in its PCRs and to reliably report those mea-
surements to a remote verifier (remote attestation based on
a pre-installed endorsement key), as well as creating secure
storage through TPM protected credentials and data sealing
with extended authorization policies. Further, the TPM non-
volatile memory, including secure monotonic counters, can
be attractive for building security solutions, e.g., version roll-
back prevention for software updates.
By now, a number of real world applications make use of
TPM. For instance, IBM’s password manager uses it for stor-
ing keys, Microsoft windows management instrumentation
uses TPM for cryptographic co-processing, Intel’s Trusted
eXecution Technology or AMD’s Secure Technology rely on
a hardware TPM, several VPN apps can make use of it, TPM
is used in full disk encryption (e.g., Microsoft Bitlocker, dm-
crypt), and even browsers like Chrome make use of TPM for
different purposes.
Measured boot: Of particular relevance for this paper is
measured (or authenticated) boot based on TPM (see Fig-
ure 1). During a measured boot, every component in the boot
chain P# measures the next component—a cryptographic
hash of the component—and then stores this measurement in
the PCR of the TPM ( M# ) before passing on control. Since
BL1 does not have a preceding component, it is not mea-
sured and acts as the Root of Trust for Measurement, which
starts the measurement chain. In contrast to a secure boot,
the components are not verified and the boot is not aborted,
however, after a measured boot the software configuration of
the boot components can be attested by the TPM or used to
seal storage to this configuration (i.e., values in the PCR).
2.3 Subscriber Identification Module (SIM)
SIM card is the module that authenticates the mobile device
in the network. The primary job of the SIM card is to prove
the identity of the owner of subscription to the cellular carrier
to enable services like calling, Internet, and various others.
Through physically separated pins, a SIM module can
achieve the same degree of independence from power sup-
ply, reset capability, clock signal, and separated I/O commu-
nication with the host platform like a TPM.
Since SIM cards are smart cards, they use command-
response communication and the application protocol data
unit (APDU) to communicate with their reader. The An-
droid radio interface layer can be extended to send special-
ized APDU commands to the SIM card, which we use in
simTPM. It is worth noting, that this APDU command sent
by the Android radio interface has to go through the base-
band processor. The structure of the APDU commands are
defined in the ISO/IEC 7816-4 standard and are recalled later
on in Section 4.
2.4 Cryptographic Preliminaries
We will use y←A (x) to denote the execution of algorithm
A outputting y, on input x. By r ←$ S we mean that r is
chosen uniformly at random over the set S. In our construc-
tion we will make use of elliptic curve groups where we will
use 1G to denote the identity element in group G and [n] to
denote the set {1, . . . ,n}. Moreover, we will make use of
bilinear maps defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Bilinear map) Let us consider cyclic groups
G1, G2, GT of a prime order p. Let g1,g2 be generators of
respectivelyG1 andG2. We call e :G1×G2→GT a bilinear
map (pairing) if it is efficiently computable and the following
holds:
Bilinearity: ∀(S,T ) ∈ G1 × G2, ∀a,b ∈ Zp, we have
e(Sa,T b) = e(S,T )a·b,
Non-degeneracy: e(P1,P2) 6= 1 is a generator of group GT .
Signature of Knowledge We now recall the definition of
signatures of knowledge (SoK) formalized by Chase and
Lysyanskaya [17]. In a signature scheme by signing a mes-
sage we show that the knowledge of the corresponding se-
cret key. For SoK schemes the idea is a bit different. We
are given a NP language L and a statement x ∈ L, associated
with the user’s identity. By signing a message the user shows
that he knows the hard-to-find witness w for this statements.
More formally, a signature of knowledge scheme is defined
as follows.
Definition 2 (SoK) Let L be a NP language defined by a
polynomial time Turing machine ML, such that all witnesses
for x ∈ L are of known polynomial length p(|x|). Then
(SetupSoK,SignSoK,VerifySoK) is a signature of knowledge
of a witness for L, for a message space M if the following
properties hold:
Correctness For all λ , x ∈ L, valid witnesses w for x (i.e.
such that ML(x,w) = 1), and m ∈M the probability
1−Pr[crs←SetupSoK(λ ),
σ ←SignSoK(crs,ML,x,w,m) :
accept←VerifySoK(crs,ML,x,m,σ)]
is a negligible function of λ .
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Simulatability There exists a PPT simulator
(SimSetupSoK,SimSignSoK) such that for all PPT
adversaries A there exists a negligible function ε such
that for all polynomials f , for all λ , for all auxiliary
inputs s ∈ {0,1} f (λ )∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr[(crs,τ)← SimSetupSoK(λ ),
b←A SimSoK(crs,τ,·,·,·,·)(s,crs) : b = 1]
−Pr[crs← SetupSoK(λ ),
b←A SignSoK(crs,·,·,·,·)(s,crs) : b = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣= ε(λ )
where the oracle SimSoK receives the values
(ML,x,w,m) as inputs, checks that the wit-
ness w given to it was correct and returns
σ ← SimSignSoK(crs,τ,ML,x,m). τ is a trapdoor
used by the simulator to simulate signatures without
knowing a witness.
Remark 1 In schemes relying on the random oracle
model, this trapdoor is usually not used.
Extraction There exists an extractor algorithm Extract
such that for all PPT adversaries A there exists a neg-
ligible function ε such that for all polynomials f , for all
λ , for all auxiliary inputs s ∈ {0,1} f (λ )
Pr[(crs,τ)← SimSetupSoK(λ ),
(ML,x,m,σ)←A SimSoK(crs,τ,·,·,·,·)(s,crs)
w← ExtractSoK(crs,τ,ML,x,m,σ) : ML(x,w) = 1
∨ (ML,x,m,w) ∈ Q
∨VerifySoK(crs,ML,x,m,σ) = reject] = 1− ε(λ ),
where Q denotes a list of all previous queries
(ML,x,m,w) A has sent to the oracle SimSoK.
Typically we obtain signatures of knowledge by convert-
ing a three move zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (e.g.
a Σ-protocol) to a signature protocol by applying the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [29]. We can for example transform a Σ-
protocol for proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm of
X to a signature of knowledge. We will use the Camenisch-
Stadler notation [16] to describe signature of knowledge. So,
the above mentioned Σ-protocol transformed into a signature
of knowledge on message m will be denoted as
SoK{(α) : gα = X}(m),
where in this case α is the witness which knowledge we
show and X is part of the statement.
Additively Homomorphic Encryption Scheme Homo-
morphic encryption schemes are standard cryptosystems that
allow for an additional operation on ciphertexts. In case of
additively homomorphic schemes, given ciphertext of mes-
sage m1 and message m2 we can compute the ciphertext of
message m1 +m2 (for most schemes this is modular addi-
tion) without the knowledge of m1,m2 and the secret key.
More formally, we define a additively homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme as follows. Note that to simplify notation we
added two algorithms Add and MulC.
Definition 3 An additively homomorphic encryption
scheme E consists of the following PPT algorithms
(KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Add,MulC):
KeyGen(λ ): on input security parameter λ , this algorithm
outputs a secret key skE and public key pkE .
Enc(pkE ,m): on input message m ∈M and public key pkE ,
this algorithm outputs ciphertext c ∈ C .
Dec(skE ,c): on input ciphertext c ∈ C and secret key skE ,
this algorithm outputs message m ∈M .
Add(pkE ,c1,c2): on input ciphertext c1 ∈C , ciphertext c2 ∈
C and public key pkE , this algorithm outputs ciphertext
c3 ∈ C .
MulC(pkE ,c1,m): on input ciphertext c1 ∈ C , message m ∈
M and public key pkE , this algorithm outputs cipher-
text c2 ∈ C .
We require that an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme is correct and IND-CPA secure, which we define as
follows:
Correctness For all λ , all (skE ,pkE ) ← KeyGen(λ ),
all m ∈M , all pairs (m1,m2) ∈M ×M such that
m = m1 +m2, all pairs (m3,m4) ∈M ×M such that
m = m3 · m4, we have Dec(skE ,Enc(pkE ,m)) = m.
Additionally, we have Dec(skE ,c1,2) = m,
where c1 ← Enc(pkE ,m1), c2 ← Enc(pkE ,m2),
c1,2 ← Add(pkE ,c1,c2) and Dec(skE ,c3,4) = m where
c3← Enc(pkE ,m3), and c3,4←MulC(pkE ,c3,m4).
Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack An
encryption scheme E is IND-CPA secure, if for all
PPT adversaries A we have that the advantage of the
adversary AdvIND-CPAE ,A (λ ) defined as the probability:
|Pr[(skE ,pkE )← KeyGen(λ ),(m0,m1,st)←A (pkE ),
b←$ {0,1},c← Enc(pkE ,mb), bˆ←A (st,c) : b = bˆ],
where we require that m0,m1 ∈M , is a negligible fun-
tion of λ .
Notable additively homomorphic encryption schemes are
the Paillier cryptosystem [55] and the Okamoto-Uchiyama
cryptosystem [54]. Paillier’s scheme uses a large RSA mod-
ulus n= p ·q and operations in the group Z∗n2 , where also the
ciphertext lies. The message space is Zn. The Okamoto-
Uchiyama cryptosystem uses a modulus of the form n =
p2 ·q, the ciphertext lies in Z∗n and the message space is Zp.
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3 Requirement Analysis & Systematization of
Existing Solutions
There exists many approaches to realize TPM in a way dif-
ferent than using a dedicated hardware TPM. In this sec-
tion, we systematically compare different solutions of trusted
computing procedures using both hardware and software that
are representative for the different implementation options.
For comparison, we first re-enumerate the objectives a se-
cure and practical TPM implementation needs to fulfill (Sec-
tion 3.1) and then discuss the existing solutions (Sections 3.2
through 3.4). In particular, this systematization should help
to understand the trade-off of the proposed solutions in com-
parison to the default hardware TPM and where our simTPM
solution fits into. Table 1 summarizes the discussion in the
remainder of this section.
3.1 Objectives
We start by briefly formulating the objectives a trusted mod-
ule, in particular for mobile devices, should fulfill. We group
them into security of the TPM itself, the applicability of the
implementation, and desirable deploy-ability objectives.
3.1.1 Security of TPM
These are objectives that should be fulfilled to ensure the
security of the TPM state, its execution and trustworthiness,
and secure operations.
S1 Confidentiality and integrity of TPM state: The TPM
state should be confidential and protected against untrusted
code (e.g., host platform, non-TEE apps) and only be avail-
able to authorized entities. We assign4 if the confidentiality
and integrity of the state is protected through strong security
means (e.g., physical isolation), J if they depend on soft-
ware integrity (e.g., of the OS), and 8 in other cases.
S2 Rollback Protection: Reverting the TPM state back to
a former version must be prevented or at least be detectable.
We assign 4 if rollback protection is guaranteed through
hardware means (e.g., hardware counters), J if there is a
dependency on untrusted OS but rollbacks can be detected,
8 if no rollback protection or detection is provided.
S3 Trustworthy Endorsement: A TPM should be carrying
an asymmetric encryption key called Endorsement key (EK)
that can live as long as the TPM and for which credentials
exist that verify the authenticity of the TPM and allow a ver-
ifier to recognize a genuine TPM. We assign 4 if endorse-
ment credentials are available to the TPM (e.g., pre-installed
at manufacturing time or derived from other verifiable cre-
dentials), J if the TPM has to create an EK and prove it is
genuine through a remote verification, 8 otherwise.
S4 Secure Counter: TPM has to provide secure, persistent
monotonic counters, e.g., for its clients or extended autho-
rization policies. We assign 4 if the TPM provides such
counters backed by hardware support or NV-storage of the
TPM software state that is protected (i.e., S1, S2 both 4).
We assign J if the security of the counter depends on soft-
ware integrity (e.g., of the OS or hypervisor). Otherwise 8.
S5 Secure Clock: A clock is needed for attestation, for
generation of timed attestation keys, and for authorization
policies with lock-out time. If a secure clock is available to
the TPM (e.g., its own hardware clock), we assign 4; if the
clock depends on shared resources but manipulation can be
detected we assign J, otherwise 8.
S6 Security of TPM Execution: The execution of the TPM
code or firmware has to be protected against compromise.
We assign4 if a strong security boundary exists between un-
trusted code and the TPM execution environment (e.g., ded-
icated physical chip). If the execution environment shares
hardware resources (e.g., CPU or RAM) with untrusted code
and the shared resources provide isolation (e.g., modes of
operation of CPU and separate memory regions), we assign
J, since the shared resources open an attack surface. If the
security of the TPM execution environment is based purely
on software means (e.g., hypervisor or OS), we assign 8 for
this weakest form of isolation.
3.1.2 Applicability
These are objectives related to the application of TPM, such
as authenticated boot or providing secure storage to clients.
A1 Secure Persistent Storage: TPM provides a persistent
storage to securely store limited amounts of data (e.g., cer-
tificates). We assign 4 if the TPM provides such storage
(e.g., NV-RAM in a dedicated chip) and J if the persistent
storage is part of an outsourced TPM state that is protected
(i.e., S1, S2 both 4). We assign 8 in other cases.
A2 Early Availability: A main use-case for TPM is storing
the measurement of loaded software components, i.e., mea-
sured boot. To be able to attest the entire software stack, the
TPM has to be early available during the boot sequence. If
the trusted module is available as soon as the platform has
power, we assign 4. Otherwise, if the TPM becomes avail-
able at late stage during boot (e.g., after initializing a separate
execution environment), we assign 8.
A3 Multiple Stakeholders: Computer systems, in partic-
ular mobile platforms and enterprise devices, usually have
multiple stakeholders co-existing with an interest in protect-
ing credentials and software on the platform (e.g., end-user,
administrator, network operator, software vendor). If the
TPM was designed to support both platform software and
users (e.g., distinct hierarchies), we assign 4. If the TPM
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primarily supports the platform but offers limited function-
ality to the end-user, we give J. If the TPM was designed
solely as support for the platform vendor, we give 8.
3.1.3 Deploy-ability
Objectives related to the deployment of TPM, in particular
if deployment complies with the requirements of mobile de-
vices or if it is bound to a specific platform.
D1 Mobile Availability: We want to have the TPM avail-
able for mobile devices. This imposes strict constraints, such
as not changing the current architecture by adding a new on-
board chip. If the TPM implementation adheres to this con-
straints, we assign 4, otherwise 8.
D2 Movability: The TCG specification has introduced the
TPM as being bound to its host platform (e.g., fixed part of
the motherboard). However, depending on the context, the
movability of the TPM to another platform is desirable, e.g.,
if an associated virtual machine migrates to another platform.
If the TPM is generally easily moved to another platform, we
assign 4, if it is bound to a specific platform, we assign 8.
D3 Bound RTM: The measurements during a measured
boot are given to the TPM by the host platform, starting with
the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM). To ensure that the
provided measurements indeed describe the TPM’s host plat-
form’s configuration, TPM and RTM must be bound together
on the same platform. If this binding is achieved via physi-
cal means (e.g., TPM and RTM are fixed parts of the same
motherboard), we assign 4. If the TPM receives those mea-
surements from another trusted entity (e.g., another, bound
TPM, or a secure boot anchored at the RTM), we assign J.
If the TPM cannot establish trust into the RTM, we assign 8.
In Section 2.2, while introducing the hardware TPM, we
explained all its properties, which allow the TPM to achieve
the objectives we defined in Section 3.1 and summarized in
Table 1. Objectives S1 to S6 and A1 to A3 are our interpreta-
tion of properties derived from TCG’s mobile TPM [64, 66]
and standard TPM specification [65, 67]. We define Deploy-
ability as added objectives that simTPM should achieve.
The current TCG specifications do not stipulate a removable
TPM. We will use the standard hardware TPM as the base-
line that simTPM should achieve.
3.2 fTPM
Specifically for the mobile domain, a number of past im-
plementations [69, 26, 57] leveraged trusted execution en-
vironments (TEE) to realize a software-based TPM. We use
Microsoft’s fTPM [57] as a representative for those imple-
mentations, since it is one of the most recent solutions. The
fTPM implementation is widely deployed in Microsoft mo-
bile devices using a TEE on top of ARM TrustZone (D1:4).
TrustZone creates a memory and process isolation between
the protected environment (”secure world”) running inside
the TEE and the ”normal world” (i.e., Android or similar),
and allows the execution to switch contexts between those
two worlds via a secure monitor.
fTPM provides confidentiality, integrity (S1:4), and roll-
back protection (S2:4) for fTPM states by creating a trusted
storage through a combination of encryption with fused keys,
device UUID, and Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB)
with authenticated writes and write counter. Any form of se-
cure persistent storage the fTPM offers to clients is based on
this securely outsourced state (A1: J), which is also used to
provide secure counters to clients (S4: 4).
Due to ARM TrustZone, the execution of the fTPM envi-
ronment is isolated from the normal world, however, both
worlds still share the CPU and RAM (S6: J), which has
opened TrustZone TEEs to attacks (e.g., [42]).
fTPM does not have a separate secure clock. It uses the
clock of the system in cooperation with the untrusted OS
(S5: J). To handle the shared clock situation, fTPM im-
plements fate sharing, where fTPM refuses to provide any
functionality if the OS does not cooperate.
fTPM is primarily designed to provide TPM support to
the platform vendor (A3: 8). The fTPM is a software imple-
mentation and bound to one device (D2: 8), since it derives
many of its credentials from device-specific keys or UUIDs,
including its endorsement credentials (S3: 4).
Since the fTPM is implemented as software in the TEE
on top of ARM TrustZone, the fTPM becomes only avail-
able once the TEE has been initialized during the boot se-
quence (see also Section 2). That means the fTPM (or any
TEE-based TPM) is not early enough available to store mea-
surements of the early boot stages (A2: 8). But this can be
alleviated by introducing shared memory between the boot-
loaders and TEE for measurement storage. We will discuss
this solution in more details in Section 4.4.
Although the fTPM is only available after the bootchain
has created the TEE, the secure boot transitively extends the
trust put into the RTM (BL1) to the remainder of the secure
bootchain on the same platform as the TEE. Thus, fTPM can
assume that the measurements are done as if by the RTM on
the same platform (D3: 4) if the measurements comes from
a component of the secure bootchain.
3.3 vTPM
Another way of implementing a software TPM is by creating
virtual instances over a physical TPM [9]. This, in particular,
targets cloud environments in which virtual machines need a
TPM, but sharing a single physical TPM (or providing an ar-
ray of physical TPM) is not an option. The representative
work for virtual TPM, or vTPM, is based on the Xen hy-
pervisor and proposes two different implementation options:
1) a software only implementation with vTPM instances run-
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Table 1: Comparison of existing TPM implementations
Category Objective fT
PM
[5
7]
vT
PM
?
[9
]
In
te
lS
G
X
[2
0]
si
m
T
PM
H
ar
dw
ar
e
T
PM
Security of TPM
Security of TPM state
S1. Confidentiality and integrity 4 4/ J R 4 4
S2. Rollback protection 4 4/ J 4 4 4
S3. Trustworthy Endorsement 4 J/ J 4 4 4
S4. Secure counter 4 4/ J 4 4 4
S5. Secure clock J 4/ 8 8 4 4
S6. Security of TPM execution J 4/ 8 R 4 4
Applicability
A1. Secure persistent storage J 4/ 8 J 4 4
A2. Early availability 8 4/ 4 8 4 4
A3. Multiple stake holder 8 4/ 4 4 4 4
Deploy-ability D1. Mobile availability 4 8/ 8 8 4 8D2. Movability 8 4/ 4 8 4 8
D3. Bound RTM 4 8/ J 4 J 4
4 = fulfilled by the implementation; J = partially fulfilled by the implementation; 8 = not fulfilled by the implementation; R = not applicable for the implementation
? First column is for Secure co-processor based vTPM (SCoP) implementation and second column is for Software only vTPM (SW-only) implementation
ning inside a privileged VM, and 2) a secure co-processor
(SCoP) to run all vTPM instances with better isolation at the
cost of additional hardware. Both options are not feasible for
mobile TPMs (D1: 8), since virtualization is not sufficiently
supported or effective, and adding a secure co-processor is
too costly in terms of space and power. However, by design
vTPMs must be movable to different platforms to support
migration of associated VMs between platforms (D2: 4).
In both deployment options, a vTPM has to create its en-
dorsement key at creation time. To establish trust into the
EK for a remote verifier, a genuine, primary TPM on the
platform (hardware TPM) must attest the trustworthiness of
the vTPM’s EK (S3: J).
In case of SCoP-vTPM, the TPM logic and vTPM
instances are executed inside the secure co-processor
(S6|SCoP-vTPM:4). Further, the secure co-processor used
in [9] (an IBM PCIXCC) provides CMOS RAM backed per-
sistent storage. We assume it provides the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and rollback protection of the vTPM states as well as
sufficient secure persistent storage to the vTPM clients (S1,
S2, A1|SCoP-vTPM: 4). The same co-processor also of-
fers facilities for secure counters (S4|SCoP-vTPM: 4) and
a secure clock (S5|SCoP-vTPM: 4).
For SW-only-vTPM the vTPM instances reside in Xen’s
privileged dom0. Thus, their execution is protected from
untrusted VMs by only the Xen hypervisor (S6|SW-only-
vTPM: 8), and their state, when stored in persistent stor-
age in dom0, is also protected by only the access control
and isolation of the hypervisor and dom0 (S1, S2|SW-only-
vTPM: J). Similar, the protection of any persistent stor-
age offered to vTPM clients depends on the integrity and
trustworthiness of dom0 (A1|SW-only-vTPM: 8) as does
any counter stored in the vTPM state (S4|SCoP-vTPM: J).
A vTPM relies on the platform’s clock shared between all
vTPMs including untrusted code and not specifically pro-
tected (S5|SCoP-vTPM: 8). Although vTPM instances are
created after the host platform has booted up, a vTPM re-
ceives the initial measurement from the underlying hardware
TPM of its platform, which also attests the vTPM trustwor-
thiness, and dom0 protects the vTPM state from migrating
to an untrusted platform (D3|SW-only-vTPM: J). Further,
vTPM instances are created together with their associated
VM, hence, allowing the VM to measure its entire bootchain
and store the measurements in its vTPM (A2: 4).
In case of SCoP-vTPM, the TPM resides entirely in the
IBM PCIXCC, a removable peripheral. Thus, no physical
binding to the RTM exists and no authenticity/trustworthi-
ness of the RTM is being ensured (D3|SCoP-vTPM: 8),
hence, an attacker could move the TPM to an untrusted plat-
form that feeds the TPM with arbitrary measurements. This
situation is very similar to our simTPM, which is also re-
movable, and we discuss solutions to this challenge in Sec-
tion 4.4, which might also be applicable to SCoP-vTPM.
The vTPM does not make any assumptions about which
stakeholder—user or platform—within the associated VM
uses the vTPM and supports, like a regular hardware TPM,
multiple hierarchies (A3: 4).
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3.4 Intel SGX
Although Intel SGX is not an implementation of a TPM but a
solution to allow applications to establish a TEE, enclave in
SGX jargon (S1, S7: R), we include it here for comparison
because it offers in many dimensions similar protections as
a hardware TPM and shares a lot of a TPM’s objectives (we
mark non-applicable objectives with R in Table 1). For this
work we have only considered stock SGX implementations
in Intel processor to keep the comparison on par with other
candidates. SGX is currently only supported by desktop and
server class Intel processors (D1: 8) and binds any creden-
tials, like generated and derived keys, and transitively sealed
data strictly to the CPU (D2: 8).
In SGX, attestation means verifying that a certain enclave
code was initialized correctly and not tampered with by the
untrusted host OS. For remote attestation in SGX an Intel-
provided Quoting Enclave provides the facilities to enclaves
to do direct anonymous attestation (DAA) using attestation
keys endorsed by Intel (S3: 4). The SGX extensions to the
CPU measure the enclaves, hence, the enclaves are physi-
cally bound to their RTM (D3: 4).
SGX supports enclaves in sealing data for storing it on un-
trusted persistent storage, since enclaves themselves do not
have any persistent storage like NV-RAM (A1: J). In addi-
tion, Intel has added support for monotonic counters [31, 44]
that allow rollback protection of sealed data (S4, S2: 4).
It is a processor based technology, so it can fully utilize
the clock of the system. But the current SGX implementa-
tion does not accommodate a trusted and fine grained clock
for the user-level enclaves. There is a certain API, provided
by Intel e.g., get_trusted_time. But this call can be arbitrar-
ily modified by the untrusted OS, since it requires to make
an OCALL [4, 18, 38, 6, 32]. Moreover, any timing mecha-
nism must account for the fact that the OS can interrupt the
enclave at any point in its execution, wait for an arbitrary pe-
riod of time, and then transparently resume the enclave using
ERESUME (S5: 8).
Both regular applications and system software can use en-
claves and SGX is not restricted to particular stakeholders
(A3: 4). However, an early firmware initialized enclave is
not possible, since the OS is needed for memory manage-
ment of enclaves (A2: 8).
3.5 Java-card based MTM
Dietrich and Winter proposed a way of implementing a mo-
bile trusted module (MTM) in a Java-based smart-card for
mobile devices [22, 27]. The implementation is for ap-
plications running on mobiles and the TPM communicates
through NFC.
The TPM is installed as a set of applets in the Java-card,
where a master-applet provides services to other applets, like
TPM command handling and controls the access to the en-
dorsement key. The actual processing of TPM commands is
handled by specific applets implementing those commands.
Although this implementation seems like closest related
work to our simTPM, their work described a proof-of-
concept prototype and is unfortunately silent about many
aspects, such as secure persistent storage, and some func-
tionality is not available, such as attestation of the system
or authenticated boot. The Java-card communicates with the
system over NFC, so binding the card with the system is not
possible and early availability of the trusted module is also
not possible before the NFC driver is loaded.
Their implementation provides important insights on the
implementation of MTM on mobile devices through a pro-
grammable TPM and presented pioneering work, but given
the lack of documentation and also differences in engineer-
ing (see Section 4), we cannot provide a full and fair compar-
ison with simTPM and exclude it from our systematization.
4 System Design and Security Analysis
The main component of simTPM is a smart card based im-
plementation of a SIM TPM. However, to properly work it
also requires changes in the bootloader and the operating sys-
tem (i.e., Android). In this section, we describe the design
and implementation of simTPM in more details. We also
discuss how our solution solves the shortcomings described
in Section 3 and argue about our design’s security. Along
with the design descriptions, we indicate how the objectives
shown in Table 1 are met by simTPM.
4.1 SIM TPM
Modern SIM cards are usually general purpose smart cards
running an applet created by the mobile network provider.
The two most prominent smart card technologies are Java
Cards and Multos cards. Both introduce a custom OS (i.e.,
Java Card OS and Multos OS) and APIs that can be used
by programmers for cryptographic (e.g., encryption, signing)
and non-cryptographic (e.g., memory allocation and copy)
operations that are implemented and executed directly on
the microprocessor. Depending on the technology, applets
can be programmed in C/C++ (e.g., Multos cards) or in Java
(e.g., Java Card). Additional cryptographic algorithms, not
provided by the API, can be implemented in software.
Both card technologies have support for multiple applets.
To properly manage them, cards provide a specialized secu-
rity manager that is responsible for installing and deleting of
user defined applets. Once an applet is uploaded, the security
manager creates its instance and allows the applet to create
necessary objects and allocate memory.
8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
CLA INS P1 P2
DATA LEN
DATA
(up to 255 bytes)
EXP DATA SIZE
Figure 2: Generic APDU command structure
4.1.1 API Limitations of Smart Cards
As mentioned above, each Smart Card OS provides a card
specific API that allows applets to perform extended opera-
tions. This forces the programmer to use only a predefined
set of functions. For example, in case of Java cards the API
supports only a subset of the standard Java language and is
limited to high level cryptographic operations (e.g., encryp-
tion, hashing, signing). There is no support for mathematical
functions like modular multiplication or elliptic curve point
addition, which are one of the main building blocks of pub-
lic key cryptography. In other words, the developer cannot
use hardware support for those low-level operations and is
limited to software implementations that are inefficient due
to the overhead of the virtualization layer.
Obviously, those limitation do not directly concern TPM
commands that only use basic cryptographic operations. Un-
fortunately, the TPM standard defines a remote attestation
scheme that is not supported by the cards API, because it
uses, e.g., zero-knowledge proofs. This constitutes an in-
teresting engineering problem that we solve. In particular,
we were able to implement simTPM on a Gemalto Multi-
App Multos smart card with an Infineon SLE78CLX family
microprocessor. This card also helped us achieving process
isolation from the general-purpose processor (S6: 4). It is
worth noting, that in this paper we focused mainly on the
Multos API [43], because it supports a broader range of func-
tions than the Java card API. In particular, we were able to
efficiently implement a remote attestation scheme on-card.
4.1.2 Smart Cards and TPM Command Parsing
SIM cards are connected to the main processing unit over
a separate bus and available for mobile telephony services
(D1: 4). Smart cards work in a command/response manner,
i.e., given an input the card executes the code and returns a
response. The input data is defined by an APDU command
(see Figure 2), which consists of a class byte (CLA), an in-
struction byte (INS), two bytes for parameters (P1, P2), one
byte for the expected response length, one byte for the data
length (DATA LEN), and DATA LEN bytes of data. The
cards’ response contains the response data and two bytes that
constitute the status word (not shown in the figure). The data
field is limited to 255 bytes. There exist an extended length
APDU specification that allows for a larger data field but it
is not widely implemented.
In a multi applet system, an APDU command will be for-
warded to the currently selected applet. To select an applet,
the SELECT APDU command with an unique applet identifier
has to be sent to the card. This command is then recognized
and executed by the OS. Once selected, the applet can parse
incoming commands according to its work flow. In particu-
lar, this means that the developer can use the instruction and
parameters bytes to program the behavior of the card.
The APDU data structure provides a convenient way to
communicate with the card. We designed a custom APDU
command that implements TPM commands. The data length
size of up to 255 bytes is sufficient for the payload sizes of
most TPM commands, and for TPM commands with larger
payload sizes (e.g., sealed data blobs), we send the payload
split across multiple APDU messages and use the parameter
bytes to communicate the card if more data is to be expected.
Changes to Android’s radio interface: The Android Ra-
dio interface layer (RIL) is responsible for communicating
with the device’s SIM card. To allow RIL to communicate
with simTPM, we introduced a set of TPM commands. We
implemented a custom RIL as a shared library, which sends
APDU commands as bulk transfer to the simTPM and re-
ceives its responses.
4.1.3 TPM Commands
We now briefly discuss how we designed the card to handle
basic TPM commands related to PCR banks and sealing. The
former case is easy, the applet reserves enough non-volatile
memory to store the PCRs. The number of banks is defined
by the installation parameter of the TPM applet, which also
defines the algorithm we use to extend the PCR (e.g., SHA1
or SHA256). In a standard setup we use 24 PCRs. For the
TPM_EXTEND and TPM_READ commands we used two sepa-
rate instruction bytes (respectively, 0x10 and 0x20) to form
the APDU. In both cases the number of the PCRs is given
using parameter P1.
To design (un-)sealing on a smart card was a bit harder.
Due to the limited input data size, the card has to encryp-
t/decrypt the input in chunks, which are split across multiple
APDU messages. The storage key for sealing is generated by
the card after receiving the TPM_INIT command. The key is
stored in the non-volatile memory that is allocated during in-
stallation of the applet (see next Section 4.1.4).
It is worth noting that smart cards can be programmed to
execute all TPM commands that require basic cryptographic
algorithms, on-card key generation, key agreement, or stor-
ing data in volatile/non-volatile memory. Unfortunately,
the privacy-preserving variant of remote attestation (i.e., di-
rect anonymous attestation, DAA) requires zero-knowledge
proofs and other unsupported crypto operations. What is
more, in versions below TPM 2.0 the specification defined
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only one algorithm for anonymous attestation [14], which is
based on groups with hidden order (i.e., using a RSA mod-
ulus) and Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. The TPM
2.0 specification, however, allows for algorithm agility. We
leveraged this fact and used a custom scheme, which we
present in the next subsection. Here, we only draft the idea
behind the scheme, which follows the generic approach used
by other DAA schemes: The TPM receives a signature/cer-
tificate under its secret DAA key from an authority. It then
uses this secret key to certify its attestation key using a proof.
In this zero-knowledge proof the TPM shows that it knows
a certificate under a DAA key and a signature created using
this key under an attestation key. The scheme uses Boneh
and Boyen [11] signatures and an efficient zero-knowledge
proof for the above statement that is made non-interactive
using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [29]. The main advan-
tage of the scheme is that it can be executed solely by the
TPM (i.e., on-card) and does not require any involvement
of the host platform. To further improve efficiency of our
scheme, we decided to optimize the workload between com-
mands, i.e., if the TPM_CREATE command recognizes that the
TPM is creating an attestation key, it already does some pre-
computation for the DAA certification.
4.1.4 PCR and NV storage
All smart cards implement a small amount of non-volatile
storage that can be used for various purposes. This memory
of the smart card is by design tamper-resistant and therefore
offers memory isolation from the rest of the system (S6: 4).
Modification of this memory is only possible by the applet
that reserved it and we reserve some of the NV storage for the
simTPM (A1: 4). Smart cards are equipped with features
preventing updates of its internal state by the outside world.
To update stored content (e.g., applets), one has to issue an
authorized command to the card manager to update storage
or perform applet specific commands, e.g., PCR extension
(S1: 4). Our simTPM is equipped with PCR banks that
are initialized when power cycling the device and, hence, the
SIM card, and can only be changed between power cycles
using PCR_EXTEND.
System software or user level software can keep a counter
containing the current version of the software inside the NV-
storage and updates to the counter are only allowed via au-
thorized commands. This provides an easy setup for secure
counter and rollback protection (S4: 4).
4.1.5 Trustworthy endorsement & Clock
Trustworthy endorsement of a TPM is very important. The
standard solution is to use an asymmetric encryption key
called endorsement key. This key is unique per TPM and
should stay alive as long as the TPM is alive. This key differ-
entiates a genuine from a rogue TPM. simTPM can achieve
secure endorsement by putting a (vendor) certified endorse-
ment key inside its NV-storage and implementing TPM logic
that ensures that the private portion of the key is never re-
leased to the outside world (S3: 4).
SIM cards are equipped with a clock pin connected to the
baseband processor. Thus, they cannot be clocked higher or
lower by an untrusted application or OS. This separate clock
helps simTPM to work on a different clock frequency not un-
der direct influence of the main processor. What is more, the
baseband processor can be used as a secure external clock.
In particular, since the baseband processor is by default iso-
lated with a strong security boundary from untrusted code on
the platform, it can prepend any APDU command with an
APDU command containing the current time (this can also
be limited to time-sensitive TPM commands only). This way
simTPM can be provided with a secure clock (S5: 4).
4.1.6 Movability & Stakeholders
The other unique feature of the simTPM architecture is its
movability (D2: 4). simTPM implements the TPM inside
the SIM card. So by design, simTPM can be transferred
to a different device. This creates some interesting use-
cases, which we discuss in more details in Section 6.2, but
also challenges, which we discuss separately in Section 4.4.
simTPM is not specifically bound to one particular stake-
holder and supports the multiple stakeholder model proposed
by TCG (A3: 4), although we think the end-users and their
apps are the primary beneficiaries of simTPM.
4.2 Our DAA Scheme
We begin by describing a generic construction/idea of DAA
schemes. First the issuer holding a public key gpk and a
TPM interact in a join-issue protocol upon which the TPM
obtains a signature (certificate) cert on his secret key sku,
but without revealing the secret key to the issuer. Having
a certificate on sku, the TPM randomizes it and produces a
signature of knowledge of the secret key that is certified. In
some schemes, the TPM uses the secret key sku to compute a
pseudonym nym with regards to a basename bsn. Using the
Camenisch-Stadler notation [16] we can define the Signature
of Knowledge (SoK) created by the TPM as follows:
SoK{(sku,cert) : nym=H(bsn)sku
∧Verifycert,gpk(sku) = 1},
In the above SoK, H denotes a hash function and Verify is
the verification procedure of the certificate cert on sku with
public key gpk. A common technique used to construct such
signatures of knowledge is to first design a Σ-protocol, which
can be used to prove knowledge about linear relations of ex-
ponents. Finally, the designed Σ-protocol is transformed into
a non-interactive proof (i.e. signature) via the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. The role of the pseudonym nym = Dsku , where
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Setup(λ ,n):
1. Choose groups G1 and G2 of prime order p with a bi-
linear map e :G1×G2→GT .
2. Choose at random two group generators g1 ←$ G1 and
g2←$ G2, and computes gT ← e(g1,g2).
3. Define two hash functions, H which maps into Zp and
H0 maps into G1.
4. Select skiss←$ Zp, set gpk2← gskiss2 and gpk1← gskiss1 .
5. Output the public parameters crs =
(λ ,H,H0,G1,G2,g1,g2,gT ,e,gpk1,gpk2).
Scheme 1: Direct Anonymous Attestation Setup
D = H(bsn), is to provide linkability within a single service
identified by the basename bsn. However, in case no such
linkability is necessary, the common approach is to use a ran-
dom D.
Security of this generic construction follows from the fact
that the SoK is extractable and zero-knowledge. The first
property ensures that any security reduction is able to extract
a valid certificate/secret-key pair from a given attestation.
Thus, in case the adversary manages to create a new TPM
the security reduction can extract the certificate/secret-key
pair and break unforgeability of the used signature scheme.
Note that certificates are actually signatures of the issuer on
the secret keys on TPM DAA keys. The fact that the TPM
can prove in zero-knowledge style that it knows a certificate
and that the pseudonym hides the TPM’s identity is the basis
for providing anonymity of the DAA scheme.
We base our construction on the same principles as de-
scribed above. The signature scheme that we use is the
Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [11]. In scheme 2 we show
how the issuer is able to generate this signature on the TPM’s
secret key. Next in scheme 3 we show how to generate a sig-
nature of knowledge for the statement described above and
how to verify it. Finally, to prove security we just show that
this is in fact a signature of knowledge, i.e. we proof com-
pleteness, the existence of an extraction algorithm (to show
soundness of the proof) and the existence of a simulator (to
show zero-knowledge).
Theorem 1 Scheme 3 is complete.
Proof 1 Suppose that the signer holds a pair (sku,A)∈Zp×
G1 where A = g
1/(skiss+sku)
1 and follows the protocol. In this
case
gs21 ·R−s1 ·B−c =
gt21 ·R−t1 ·gc·r1 R−c·sku ·B−c =
T1 · (gc·r1 R−c·sku) · (gr1 ·R−sku)−c =
T1 · (gr1 ·R−sku)c · (gr1 ·R−sku)−c = T1
Join(crs)↔ Issue(crs,gsk):
1. (Platform) The platform generates an additively homo-
morphic encryption scheme (skE ,pkE )← KeyGen(λ )
with message space that is a superset of Z2λ+3·p2 .
2. (Platform) The platform chooses u′i←$ Zp and computes
U ′i ← gui1 .
3. (Platform) The platform computes cu′i ← Enc(pkE ,u′i).
4. (Platform) The Platform sends U ′i , pkE and cu′i to the
issuer and proves
SoK{α : U ′i = gα1 ∧ cu′i = Enc(pkE ,α)
∧ α ∈ Zp}(gpk).
5. (Issuer) The issuer chooses u′′i ←$ Zp, computes Ui ←
U ′i ·gu
′′
i
1 .
6. (Issuer) The issuer chooses b ←$ Zp, computes
c1 ← Add(pkE ,Add(pkE ,cu′i ,cu′′i ),Enc(pkE ,skiss))
and c2←MulC(pkE ,c1,b).
7. (Issuer) The issuer chooses k ←$ Z2λ+2·p, computes
cu′′i ← Add(c2,Enc(pkE ,k · p)) and A′i = gb1.
8. (Issuer) The issuer sends cu′′i , A
′
i and u
′′
i to the platform.
9. (Platform) The platform computes skui = u
′
i + u
′′
i , de-
crypts t = Dec(skE ,cu′′i ) and computes Ai = (A
′
i)
t−1 =
g
1/(skui+skiss)
1 .
10. (Platform) The platform verifies that e(Ai,Ui · gpk2) =
gT and, if the equation holds, sets w← (Ai,skui)
Scheme 2: Direct Anonymous Attestation Join-Issue Proto-
col (In this protocol the Host acts as a Proxy)
and
Ds1 ·nym−c =
Dt1 ·Dc·sku ·nym−c =
T2 ·H(bsn)c·sku ·H(bsn)−c·sku = T2.
Furthermore,
e(R,gpk) = e(gr/(skiss+sku)1 ,gpk) = e(g
r·gsk/(skiss+sku)
1 ,g2)
and since skissskiss+sku =
skiss+sku−sku
skiss+sku
= 1− skuskiss+sku , we have
e(gr·skiss/(skiss+sku)1 ,g2) =
e(gr1 ·g−r·skiss/(skiss+sku)1 ,g2) =
e(gr1 ·R−sku ,g2) = e(B,g2).
Theorem 2 There exists a knowledge extractor for
Scheme 3.
Proof 2 By utilizing the rewinding technique, having two tu-
ples (s1,s′2,c) and (s
′
1,s
′
2,c
′) both satisfying the verification
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equations we may simply compute Aˆ and ˆsku such that nym=
H(bsn)
ˆsku and e(Aˆ,gpk · g ˆsku2 ) = gT . Denote ∆si = (si− s′i)
and ∆c = (c−c′). Since, both c and c′ are obtained from the
random oracle with the same input, both tuples need to give
the same T˜1 and T˜2. So we have that
T˜1← gs21 ·R−s1 ·B−c = g
s′2
1 ·R−s
′
1 ·B−c and
T˜2← Ds1 ·nym−c = Ds′1 ·nym−c′ .
and what follows
g∆s21 ·R−∆s1 = B∆c and
D∆s1 = nym∆c.
So we may compute α = ∆s1/∆c and β = ∆s2/∆c which sat-
isfy B = gβ1 ·R−α and nym= H(bsn)α .
Moreover from the verification equation we have that:
e(R,gpk) = e(B,g2) = e(g
β
1 ·R−α ,g2) =
e(g1,g2)β · e(R,g2)−α .
It follows that:
e(R,g2)skiss · e(R,g2)α = e(g1,g2)β .
and
e(Rβ
−1
,gskiss2 ·gα·β
−1
2 ) = e(g1,g2).
Hence we obtain (Aˆ, ˆsku) = (Rβ
−1
,α · β−1) which satisfies
nym= H(bsn)
ˆsku and e(Aˆ,gpk ·g ˆsku2 ) = gT .
Theorem 3 Assuming H is a random oracle and given pp,
bsn, nym ∈ G1 and gpk′,gpk ∈ G1×G2 there exists a sim-
ulator which generates values (R,B,c,s1,s2) indistinguish-
able from a signature returned by the original signing pro-
cedure of scheme 3.
Proof 3 Let us denote D ← H(bsn). First the simulator
chooses rˆ ∈ Zp at random and computes R← grˆ1 and B←
gpk′rˆ. At this point it is easy to see that e(R,gpk) = e(B,g2),
thus these values meet the verification equation. Next we
will show, that these values are distributed exactly as in
a real signature. We can write R = grˆ1 = g
r/(sku+skiss)
1 , for
some (unknown) r ∈ Zp and (unknown) sku ∈ Zp such that
nym = Dsku . Then, the values B looks as follows B =
gpk′rˆ = gskiss·rˆ1 = g
skiss·r/(sku+skiss)
1 . Now, it is easy to see that
r ·skiss/(sku+skiss) = r ·( (sku+skiss)−skusku+skiss ) = r ·(1−sku/(sku+
skiss)). Therefore, we have B = g
r·(1−sku/(sku+skiss))
1 = g
r
1 ·
gr·sku/(sku+skiss)1 = g
r
1 ·Rsku , what is exactly the same as in a
real signature.
What remains is to compute the t-values. So, the simulator
first chooses c,s1,s2 ∈ Z3p and computes
T1← gs21 ·Rs1 ·B−c .
T2← Ds1 ·nym−c .
Finally, the simulator programs the random oracle to output
c when queries on (gpk, D, nym, R, B, T1, T2, m).
4.3 ATF boot-loader changes
In Section 2.1, we have briefly introduced ATF and its boot-
loader chains. In this section we describe the changes we
have implemented to enable communication between the
bootloader components and the simTPM. Figure 1 can be
helpful as a visual aid for understanding.
After turning on the secondary cores on the cold boot path,
the processor kicks in the first stage BL1 of the bootloader
( 1 ). Current bootloaders are not implemented such as to
be able to communicate with a device like a SIM card and
to run a command response protocol. Thus, we have ex-
tended all the boot-loaders with the capability to communi-
cate with the SIM card via bus communication. This modi-
fication in ATF makes the simTPM already available to the
early BL1 stage (A2: 4). The bootloader software is ca-
pable of translating TPM commands to APDU commands,
sending them to simTPM, receiving responses, and translat-
ing them to a meaningful response that can be used to make
decisions (e.g., failed/successful PCR extension commands).
One thing that needed to be addressed here is that except for
BL3-3, all bootloaders are secure mode software (i.e., se-
cure world in TrustZone). So during execution, simTPM has
to be initialized as secure mode hardware to be available to
the bootloader. We initialize the simTPM as a secure mode
hardware, but after a successful boot chain verification, we
switch simTPM to normal mode (of TrustZone). This allows
us to maintain normal efficiency in the normal world, since
the SIM card functionality (e.g., calls or text messages) is ac-
cessed by Android and switching context from normal world
to secure world every time before accessing the SIM card in
Android can interrupt the normal world execution and would
be highly inefficient.
4.4 Bootstrapping trust for movable simTPM
Parno [56] was first to identify the problem of how to boot-
strap trust into a hardware TPM and the possibility of cuckoo
attacks. A fundamental problem of TPM is that the verifier
(e.g., local user) does not know if they are talking to the in-
tended (e.g., local) TPM, just that they are talking to a gen-
uine TPM. In a cuckoo attack, an attacker that compromised
the local platform can exploit this problem and fool the ver-
ifier into trusting the compromised platform: the attacker
simply relays the verifier’s communication to another (re-
mote) TPM on an attacker-controlled platform, which then
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Figure 3: Using TEE as TPM proxy to bind simTPM with
RTM and to mitigate the effects of relay attacks.
can attest an arbitrary, trustworthy state to the verifier. The
preferred solutions to prevent cuckoo attacks are hardwired
channels via a special purpose hardware interface to the
on-board TPM or, alternatively, a cryptographically secured
verifier-TPM communication where the verifier has knowl-
edge of the public key of the TPM on the intended platform.
However, those solutions make an implicit assumption:
Historically TPMs are soldered onto the motherboard, elim-
inating the issue of ensuring proper binding to the device’s
root of trust of measurement (RTM), usually in form of an
immutable piece of trusted code in the BIOS. Due to this
static design a TPM is ensured that the very first received
measurement in a chain-of-trust is coming from a trusted,
local RTM. Only a sophisticated hardware attack can break
this binding. A TPM that is by-design movable, such as
our simTPM or the PCI-attached secure co-processor for
vTPM [9], raises an interesting question about how to re-
establish this bond between TPM and RTM.
Lack of chain-of-trust: Without binding the TPM to a
trusted, local RTM, the measurements of any authenticated
boot cannot be trusted. An adversary could simply plug the
simTPM into an attacker-controlled platform and replay1 any
desired measurements sequence, i.e., create arbitrary PCR
values akin to a TPM reset attack [37, 30]. This allows the
attacker to fool a remote verifier during remote attestation
but also to gain access to sealed secrets, whose release is
bound to the platform state (i.e., PCR values).
Binding simTPM and RTM: To create a binding between
the simTPM and a trusted, local RTM, we need the simTPM
to 1) authenticate the RTM to ensure its a trusted code (e.g.,
BL1 of ATF); and to 2) ensure policies (e.g., for data re-
lease) and commands (e.g., attestation) are only executed for
exactly the platform for which the simTPM stores the mea-
surements. To address those challenges, we identified two
possible solutions, using the device’s TEE as a proxy to the
simTPM or using distance bounding protocol.
1The TPM is a passive device to which the measurements have to be
provided by its caller.
Using TEE as TPM proxy:
One way to bind the simTPM with the device’s RTM is
by leveraging the platform security building blocks of mo-
bile devices and using the TEE as a proxy to simTPM (see
Figure 3). On a genuine device with secure boot in place,
i.e., BL1 as a trusted RTM, the TEE has exclusive access
to device-specific credentials that are certified by the device
vendor. Using those credentials, the simTPM and TEE can
establish a secure end-to-end channel. In this setup, simTPM
will only respond to PCR extensions, attestation requests, or
unsealing of encrypted data if the commands come via this
secure channel. As a result, an attacker cannot forge arbitrary
PCR values without compromising the device-specific key.
Further, if the TPM enforces a particular device key, it can
ensure that only the intended platform is using the simTPM;
however, even without this strict set of device keys, this so-
lution still ensures that any TPM commands, such as releas-
ing data to the host platform, can only come from a gen-
uine mobile platform with an intact secure boot from which
it received the measurements. Considering previously men-
tioned software-based attacks against TEE (see Section 3.2),
an attacker could compromise the TEE to steal the device-
specific key and impersonate the TEE to the simTPM. This
can be alleviated by using session keys instead of the long-
term secret device-specific key for communication between
TEE and simTPM, which could be setup during the boot-
strapping and, hence, before untrusted code can attack the
TEE. A drawback of this solution is that the simTPM re-
quires the TEE to be bootstrapped to become itself opera-
tional, which prevents an early availability of the simTPM.
Since the simTPM is not early available in this setup, ATF’s
secure boot has to be extended to store the measurements
of verified software components and pass those measure-
ments on to the TEE, which then can forward them to the
simTPM via the secured channel (D3:J). It should be noted
that while this extension to ATF would also provide a solu-
tion to the early availability of fTPM [57], simTPM gives a
user-centric solution and additional interesting use-cases in
comparison to fTPM (see Section 6). We discuss an alterna-
tive solution based on distance bounding and no need for a
TEE-proxy.
Using Distance Bounding Protocol:
Another way to bind the simTPM with its RTM is by us-
ing a distance bounding (DB) protocol [13, 7, 10]. Distance
bounding is widely used for card-based payment systems.
When a credit card is punched to the card reader, the reader
runs a distance bounding protocol to check the proximity of
the card to prevent a possible relay attack. We are facing the
opposite scenario, in which the card is trying to assert the
proximity of the device where the communication partner,
here the RTM, resides.
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RTM (BL1) simTPM
init extend(pk)
IF pk NOT certified:
FAIL, untrusted certificate
nonce← random()
T1 = now()
nonce
m= signsk(nonce)
MBL2 = H(BL2) PCR SIG Extend(m, MBL2)
T2 = now()
IF (T2−T1)< δ :
IF veri f ypk(m):
PCR[0] = H(0||m)
Store nonce, m in NVRAM
unlock hierachies
PCR[1] = H(PCR[1]||MBL2)
ELSE:
ERROR, untrusted RTM
ELSE:
ERROR, not local RTM
OK|FAIL
Figure 4: Prototypical distance bounding protocol for bind-
ing local RTM (BL1) and simTPM
Prototypical distance bounding: We assume, the device
vendors equipped the simTPM with certificates for their
device-specific keys, which allows a verifier to distinguish
trusted code with access to such secrets (e.g., early boot-
stages, like BL1, or the TEE) from untrusted code, like the
host OS or regular apps. To assert the proximity of the RTM,
only the very first measurement provided to the simTPM,
i.e., the measurement by the BL1 (RTM) of BL2, has to be
checked for proximity. After that, the chain of trust of an
authenticated boot will transitively extend this trust into the
locality of the RTM. Figure 4 illustrates a prototypical pro-
tocol for our scenario. We consider a two-step PCR exten-
sion by the RTM for verifying the proximity. First, the RTM
provides the public key pk of its device-specific key (or a
key derived from it) to the TPM, which then can verify the
authenticity of the RTM using the vendor-supplied certifi-
cate. Afterwards, as in other distance bounding protocols,
the simTPM (verifier) challenges the RTM (prover) with a
nonce to which the RTM replies with the signed nonce value
(using the authenticated private key) as well as the PCR ex-
tension arguments. If this reply of the signed nonce is re-
ceived within a time threshold T and the signature verifies,
simTPM assumes the RTM to be local and extends the PCR
with the supplied measurement value MBL2; if either condi-
tion fails, the simTPM aborts. For robustness of the protocol,
the challenge-response can be repeated N times to decrease
the chances of a legitimate, local RTM failing the threshold.
Prototypical setup: In general, calculating the threshold
for distance bounding is difficult, because various factors can
influence the response time. For instance, jitters of the net-
work over which the verifier and prover communicate, inter-
rupts of the prover’s computation, cache and memory delays,
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tion with the SIM card goes through the SIM card reader to
the baseband processor to the CPU
etc. might introduce a high uncertainty of the expectable re-
sponse time. At first glance, our particular scenario seems
very favorable for a distance bounding protocol, since the
prover (RTM) is the BL1 and hence has exclusively con-
trol of the CPU without interrupts or interference of an OS;
and the RTM is connected to the SIM card over a 480 mbps
USB 2.0 bus, in modern devices even via a USB 3.0 bus
with 5 gbps, with no parallel transfers, providing favorable
circumstances for a challenge-response protocol and small
error-margin in which an attacker has to fall for a successful,
undetected relay attack [23, 21, 45].
The SIM card is connected to the phone through a reader,
which is directly connected to the baseband processor. The
reader powers the smart card and provides it with the base-
band’s clock. The clock duty cycle shall be between 40%
and 60% of the period during stable operation [28]. Mod-
ern smart cards support clock stop to allow preservation of
power, which an attack could use to tamper with the verifier’s
perception of time. However, this feature can be disabled by
initializing the card as clock stop not allowed by setting the
VERIFY CHV command to 0. Disabling this feature will
increase the phone’s battery consumption, but not in a sig-
nificant amount, since the maximum current consumption of
an idle SIM card should not exceed 200µA.
The SIM card and the reader connection are in a con-
tact connection and generally interfaces within 20ns [15, 39].
The reader connects to the baseband processor through Non-
Level-Shifted bidirectional I/O (see Figure 5). The connec-
tion in our test setup goes through an USB 2.0 bus with
480 mbps. The baseband processor connects to the CPU
with a system bus (varies between a USB 2.0 bus and USB
3.0 bus) with a speed of at least 480 mbps. Communication
between SIM card and the CPU via this bus interface lies
within a range of 35ns to 72ns.
Measurements and setting threshold: We conducted a
series of measurements on our test device to evaluate the fea-
sibility of distance bounding to bind the RTM and simTPM.
We measured 30 times2 the speed of the prover (RTM) for
2A single measurement requires ≈5min, since only a single measure-
ment per power-cycle is possible on our test device.
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Figure 6: Cumulative frequency distribution of the RTM re-
sponse time in our measurements (N = 30)
calculating the response to the challenge (64 bits nonce) us-
ing ECC with the NIST P-256 curve. In our test, the re-
sponses took between 563µs and 894µs, and the average re-
sponse time was 669.759± 49.804µs for a confidence level
of 99%. Figure 6 shows the CFD of the RTM response time,
where 83% of all responses were≤ 721µs and 93% of all re-
sponses were ≤ 812µs. From our dataset the success chance
of the distance bounding protocol PDB for a single round is
the cumulative probability sampled over the frequency dis-
tribution in Figure 6. If were to set the threshold T for suc-
cessful distance bounding to 721 µs:
PDB = Pr[x ≤ 721] = ∑721i=563 Pr[x = i] ≈ 0.83
where 563 µs is the lowest latency in our dataset. Going
below 721 µs reduces the probability of a successful bound-
ing protocol for legitimate devices, i.e., to 0.52 for a thresh-
old of 649µs. To increase the chances for local RTM to
pass the distance bounding check, a successful verification
usually requires that the response is below T for a suffi-
cient fraction f of the responses, means at-least f × n out
of n responses should arrive within T . When modeling the
challenge-response game as binomial distribution and requir-
ing f × n responses within 721 µs out of n responses (i.e.,
success probability PDB = 0.83), the cumulative probability
distribution is:
Pr[x≥ f n] = ∑ni= f n
(
n
i
)
(p)i(1− p)n−i where p ∈ {PDB}
Figure 7 shows the success probabilities for different
choices of f and n. An optimal choice minimizes n (lower
overall runtime overhead for the protocol) while maximiz-
ing Pr[x ≥ f n] and minimizing the chance of the attacker to
successfully relay. We have observed from our dataset that
setting f = 0.47 for n = 30 (i.e., 14 out of 30 runs) offers a
success rate Pr[x≥ f n]=0.99999724049 for local RTM.
Attacker chances: The APDU package for the challenge
is 112 bits and for the response 304 bits, which are trans-
ferred virtually instantly between verifier and prover (≤
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Figure 7: Success probability of local RTM for distance
bounding depending on f and n for T = 721µs (p = 0.83)
1µs). Thus, the response time measured in Figure 6 consists
virtually only of the processing time of the RTM, which an
attacker cannot speed up (see Figure 3). As a consequence,
if an attacker requires more than 721− 563 = 158µs to re-
lay the challenge and the response, the relay attack has no
chance of winning, since the RTM in our tests required at
least 563µs to compute the response. Assuming a packet
size of 55 bytes (minimal Ethernet frame size, IP header, and
UDP package with 1 byte payload for the nonce/response),
the attacker needs at least a relay bandwith of ≈ 5.87 mbps
to have any chance of winning, which is a very reasonable
assumption. Hence, attacks against this distance bounding
are feasible. From our measurements it is hard to concretely
model the attacker, however, the attack chance is already
0.1% when relaying via Ethernet and an IP network (55 bytes
datasize) with a bandwith of ≈ 49 mbps, or when relaying
only the APDU data of 14 bytes (e.g., via a custom build
connection) with ≈ 10 mbps.
4.5 Security analysis
Lastly, we analyze the security of simTPM in comparison to
the closest solutions fTPM and hardware TPM, specifically
considering the deployment of our TPM on a SIM card.
Off-chip protection: As mentioned in Section 3, fTPM
depends on the integrity of the secure world, which has been
under attack recently [58, 42, 19, 8, 3, 60, 59, 52]. Our
simTPM implements an off-board TPM on the SIM card and,
like a discrete TPM, is physically isolated from untrusted
code. This provides a stronger protection of the simTPM’s
trusted computing base, however, we cannot fully exclude
potential software attacks against the SIM card software. For
instance, in the past smart cards have exhibited bugs [51] like
hidden commands, buffer overflows, weaknesses of crypto-
graphic protocols [53], or malicious applets [53]. Further,
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like a hardware TPM, simTPM is connected via a bus, which
makes it prone to advanced bus attacks [35, 37, 12] that, how-
ever, are considered outside the attacker model for consumer
grade hardware like the TPM.
SIM card cloning: Deployment on a SIM card also raises
the concern of card cloning [68], which could easily en-
able impersonation attacks or theft of credentials. How-
ever, driven by the interests of telecommunication compa-
nies, modern SIM cards come with anti-cloning defenses that
mitigate this attack vector [43].
SIM fraud attack: The sim swap fraud centers around ex-
ploiting a mobile phone operator’s ability to seamlessly port
a telephone number to a new SIM. This scam begins with a
fraudster gathering details about the victim, either by phish-
ing emails, by social engineering or by buying victim’s de-
tails through organized criminals. Obtaining the details of
the victim, the fraudster uses social engineering techniques
to convince the telephony company to port the victims num-
ber to a fraudulent sim card owned by the fraudster and start
receiving all sms’s including secure communication (e.g.,
banking OTP). In our design the TPM is not dependent on
the SIM telephony functionalities. simTPM works as a local
co-processor with desirable attributes. An attacker can port
the telephony services to a fraudulent SIM card, but not the
TPM state, as it is bound to the local SIM-card and would
require explicit migration policies to other (SIM)TPM.
Side-channel attacks: To be compliant with the TPM 2.0
specification, the hardware has to implement cryptographic
functions that are resilient to timing-based side-channel at-
tacks. There exists a similar requirement for smart cards,
which are designed to be resistant against various types of
side-channel attacks. Thus, simTPM immediately benefits
from the security features of the underlying smart card.
However, a motivated attacker can easily move simTPM
to a controlled environment and mount different active side-
channel attacks, such as clock frequency, heat measure-
ment, probing [34], fault injection [36], or power analy-
sis [41, 48, 49]. While similar attacks have been shown
against ARM TrustZone (e.g., [40, 61]) and discrete TPM
chips [62], deploying the TPM on a removable card might
ease mounting those attacks. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that such sophisticated hardware attacks are not only strenu-
ous, exorbitant, and inconsistent, but also beyond the protec-
tion that a consumer grade security chip can offer.
5 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of simTPM on a HiKey960
board in comparison with a hardware TPM. We focus on the
most frequent commands executed by a TPM, i.e., key gen-
eration, sealing/unsealing of data, extending/reading a PCR,
generating random bytes, and computing a hash value of an
input. Beside simTPM we prepared two test setups equipped
with an Infineon SLB 9670 TPM chip. One of these two test
benches is a plug-able TPM on a Raspberry-Pi (piTPM) and
the other one is an embedded TPM on a standard Lenovo
laptop (embTPM).
The piTPM consists of an Infineon TPM SLB 9670 Irid-
ium add-on board for Raspberry Pi with a 900 MHz quad-
core cortex-A7 CPU as primary CPU and 1GB RAM. In
the embTPM, the TPM is embedded on a board equipped
with an Intel core i7-7820 2.90GHz CPU and 32 GB
RAM. The TPM SLB 9670 chip is capable of asym-
metric cryptography—ECC, ECC BN-256, ECC NIST P-
256, ECC256, ECDH, RSA1024, RSA2048—and symmet-
ric cryptography, like HMAC, SHA-1, SHA-256.
For simTPM, the platform runs Android P on a Hikey960
board. The board consists of a Kirin 960 Soc, an 8 core ARM
big.LITTLE CPU and 3GB RAM. The Android and boot-
loader implementations used in those setups and the SIM-
card implementation are explained in Section 4.1.2. The
hardware setup is detailed in Table 2.
We have used a TSS implementation by IBM [2] to com-
municate with the Infineon TPM. The results of our bench-
marks are summarized in Figure 8. All results come from 50
measurements per command per device. We report the 95%
confidence intervals.
5.1 Test cases and results
Key generation: We measured the time to generate a 256-
bit ECC key and output the public part of the key. Our
implementation of simTPM creates the key on average in
257±8.03ms, comparable to the piTPM performance (253±
1.25ms), but slower than the embTPM (172±0.61ms).
Create hash: We measured the time it takes for the TPM
to hash 256 bits of input data with SHA-256 and output the
digest. piTPM (50± 0.76ms) and embTPM (21± 0.16ms)
outperform the simTPM (72± 10.13ms) by a factor of 1.44
and 3.42, respectively.
Extending and reading a PCR: We evaluated the PCR
extend and read commands. The former allows to extend
the PCR with a new value, while the latter command is
used to read the current value of a PCR. We use SHA-
256 as hash algorithm and a 128 bit string as input value.
For PCR extension, simTPM (24± 2.66ms) is on par with
embTPM (21± 0.11ms), however, exhibits a higher insta-
bility of the performance. For reading PCRs, simTPM
(15±0.15ms) is the fastest implementation, followed by em-
bTPM (21±0.13ms). piTPM is the slowest implementation
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Figure 8: Performance comparison (in ms) of different TPM commands for simTPM and an Infineon SLB 9670 TPM2.0 on a
Raspberry-Pi and Lenovo laptop.
in both cases (41±1.22ms and 57±2.58ms) and exhibits an
unstable performance, too.
Sealing and unsealing data: The TPM seal command
takes a byte array, attaches a policy, encrypts it with a TPM
storage key, and returns a blob to the caller. When unseal-
ing, the TPM takes an encrypted blob, checks the policy, and
decrypts the blob if the policy is satisfied by the TPM state.
For our performance measurement we used 128 bits input
data, a 256-bit ECC sealing key with ECIES, and an empty
policy. The embTPM is the fatest solution for sealing and
unsealing (130±0.27ms and 89±0.46ms) and outperforms
our simTPM (588±18.55ms and 376±22.30ms) by a factor
of 4.52 and 4.22, respectively.
Random number generation: We use the TPM to gen-
erate a 64 bit random number. Our simTPM is the fastest
solution (15±0.14ms), followed by embTPM (21±0.17ms)
and then piTPM (63±1.63ms).
5.2 Discussion of performance
Our test results show that there is no clear winner among
our test systems. simTPM as well as embTPM excel for
some commands and we would argue that our simTPM pro-
totype shows a competitive performance. Unfortunately, the
implementation of Infineon SLB 9670 TPM is not publicly
available, thus commenting on the exact reasons for those
differences would result in speculations. If we would ven-
ture to speculate, potential reasons for the differences could
be the different communication buses. embTPM has a ded-
icated bus communication with the onboard processor and
a faster processor, while piTPM is running on a Raspberry
Pi and is connected over GPIO with lower bandwidth. On
the other hand, simTPM is connected through the USB bus.
Moreover, our simTPM implementation uses only the pub-
licly available APIs of the smart card OS, which provide
only an indirect access to hardware level commands. Hence,
a vendor-supported implementation with direct access to the
microprocessor would improve in efficiency.
The fTPM is unfortunately not available, precluding a
direct comparison in our test suite; however, our observa-
tions for the embTPM speed are comparable to those re-
ported by Raj et al. [57], although it is unclear which hard-
ware TPM they evaluated. An fTPM, unsurprisingly, out-
performs any other tested implementation here—e.g., slow-
est fTPM in [57] was between 2.4–15.12 times faster than
the fastest hardware TPM—since it is executed on the ARM
Cortex main application processor, whereas discrete TPMs
use slower microprocessors, as does our simTPM.
6 Use Cases
We discuss briefly how simTPM fits into the trusted com-
puting landscape and explain scenarios that are of particular
interest when simTPM and fTPM co-exist.
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Table 2: Hardware setup for performance evaluation
Setup Alias Baseboard Clock-speed Processor RAM OS TSS
piTPM RaspberryPI 2B 900 MHz ARM Cortex A7 1 GB Raspbian OS IBM TSS2.0
embTPM Lenovo 20J6CTO1WW 2.90 GHz Intel Core i7-7820 32 GB Ubuntu IBM TSS2.0
simTPM Hikey960 903 MHz Kirin960 3 GB Android P Custom
6.1 Multiple stakeholder model
The TPM specifications [67] as well as the obsolete Mobile
Trusted Module (MTM) specifications [64] acknowledged
the fact that a trusted platform might have multiple stake-
holders. In particular, mobile platforms are not considered
under the full management of the user, but critical mobile
network management is the domain of the mobile carrier/net-
work operator and the device vendor has high interest in
keeping highest privileged operations (e.g., TEE and OS) un-
der their control. The old and new TCG specifications define
recommended capabilities and various implementation alter-
natives to allow multiple stakeholders to safely coexist. For
instance, the MTM specification clearly differentiates be-
tween remote stakeholders and local stakeholders, each with
their own TPM under their control. This concept is reflected
in the recommended capabilities for a mobile TPM2.0 [66],
which advise the isolation between stakeholders and their re-
sources and policy-based authorization of stakeholder sen-
sitive data. To realize this multiple stakeholder model, the
reference architecture outlines different implementation al-
ternatives. For instance, multiple TPMs within a protected
environment like TEE, or virtual TPMs supported by a hy-
pervisor [9], where stakeholders are isolated from each other
based on the compartmentalization provided by the TEE’s
trusted OS or the hypervisor, respectively.
Our particular setting also fits well into the defined mul-
tiple stakeholder model: two distinct TPMs co-exist, each
with a distinct affinity to a different stakeholder. The fTPM
is by design designated to the platform stakeholder (i.e., de-
vice manufacturer) and it is bound to the device through
the device-specific credentials within the TEE (e.g., eFuses)
from which fTPM derives its endorsement key and to which
it anchors its key/storage hierarchies. For instance, the fTPM
described in [57] is designated entirely to the platform and its
services. In contrast, the simTPM is designated to the end-
user. This intuition is based on the observation that users
use the SIM to authenticate themselves to the mobile net-
work and rather stick to one SIM (i.e., phone number) while
changing more frequently the device. Moreover, users have
to explicitly authenticate themselves to the SIM card, i.e.,
their mobile carrier issued PIN. In this setting we are going
beyond the initial proposals by the TCG reference architec-
ture by actually assigning two distinct stakeholders to two
physically separated TPM instances, SIM card versus TEE.
Table 3: Migrating user data when switching SIM card or
device
Data bound to device Data not bound to
device
New SIM card Key duplication Key duplication
New device TPM Authorize key
policy
—
6.2 Switching SIM card or device
Since the SIM card is removable and exchangeable, two sce-
narios have to be considered: the user switches devices but
keeps the SIM card, or the user keeps the device and switches
to a new SIM card. How this affects migration of the user
data protected with the simTPM is summarized in Table 3
and explained in the following.
Switching device: When switching the mobile device and
migrating the user data to a new device, the complexity of the
operation is dependent on whether the user bound any data to
the device. For instance, during secure boot, BL1 has access
to device-specific information like the board id that uniquely
identifies the current platform (or potentially values derived
from the device-specific vendor key). This board id (like de-
rived values) can be included in the measurements collected
during secure boot (see Section 4.4) and allow the simTPM
to bind data or keys to this particular platform.3 If the user
did not bind any data/keys to the platform, no further action
is required beyond moving the SIM card to the new phone.
The entire simTPM state including the key hierarchy is in-
herently migrated to the new device and can be used to de-
crypt the user data—i.e., a form of portable sealed storage.
If the data is bound to the board id, a new feature of TPM2.0
called TPM_Authorize has to be used to avoid the problem
of ”brittle policies.” Without TPM_Authorize, the user data
would be bound to one particular board id and could never
be decrypted on another device. With TPM_Authorize different
possible board id values can be signed off as valid for a suc-
cessful verification of the platform state and, hence, decryp-
tion of data migrated with the SIM card. The valid board id
values can be signed off by the user to endorse a new phone
3Assuming a bond between the RTM and simTPM was established.
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to which data should be migrated, or by another entity, like
the mobile carrier or the user’s employer in BYOD settings.
Switching SIM card: If the user switches the SIM card
and hence moves to another simTPM, all user data has to be
migrated to the new SIM card, i.e., the necessary simTPM
keys have to be moved to the new simTPM. Independent of
whether the user data is bound to the device or not, switching
the SIM card requires the simTPM keys used for securing the
data to be duplicated to the new simTPM. This is an example
scenario for TPM2.0 key duplication to migrate keys and as-
sociated data to another TPM and is supported by simTPM.
The bottom line of those two scenarios is that a user that
wants to keep the option to migrate data secured with the
simTPM to both new SIM cards and new devices should use
duplicable keys with TPM_Authorize.
7 Discussion
The fTPM [57] is the incumbent deployment for a TPM on
mobile devices and was part of the Windows Phone plat-
form. However, it was designed primarily for vendor ser-
vices and did not specifically target the end-user. In this
work, we add to the landscape of mobile trusted comput-
ing and advocate using the dormant hardware capabilities
of SIM cards to provide (additional) TPM support on mo-
bile devices. Our systematization of related works shows
that a simTPM can take a niche among the existing works
and, in particular, inherently avoids problems of TEE-based
deployments (e.g., protected state or secure clock) that cur-
rently require compromises and modifications to the TPM
specification (e.g., ”dark period” or cooperative checkpoint-
ing of fTPM) or that make additional hardware requirements
(e.g., replay-protected memory blocks). On the other hand,
a movable TPM raises the challenge of how to bind the TPM
and the platform RTM. In this work, we proposed using the
unique features of mobile devices—secure boot and TEE
with device-specific, certified keys—to address this chal-
lenge. However, we find that this problem also affects prior
solutions, like a vTPM based on a PCI-attached secure co-
processor, and our solution might give insights into how to
establish the TPM-RTM binding in those prior works.
Our simTPM implementation is based on a physical SIM
card, thus it is currently not suitable for phones using eSIM
(e.g., Apple iPhone). However, eSIM solutions are supported
by separate hardware modules (such as JEDEC SON-8) and
it might be worthwhile to investigate how those modules can
be extended to implement a full TCG compliant TPM2.0.
Recently, Google introduced their Titan chip [70] as part
of their Nexus 3 phones, which shows the need for hardware-
backed security features in addition to TEE-based implemen-
tations on mobile end-user devices. Similar to the simTPM,
Titan chip also provides hardware-backed security for sys-
tem operations like verified booting as well as a hardware-
implemented keystore for apps and users. But Titan is exclu-
sive for Google devices, whereas our simTPM is portable be-
tween mobile devices and provides TPM2.0 compliant fea-
tures. Since implementation details are yet unknown, we ex-
cluded the Titan chip from our systematization in Section 3.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed simTPM, a hardware-based TPM
implementation for mobile devices using the SIM card. Per-
formance evaluation of our prototype shows that our im-
plementation is comparable with an existing discrete TPM
chip. Thus, we think simTPM is a practical solution to add
user-centric trusted computing technology to mobile devices
without the need to add hardware. A particular challenge
of a movable TPM is the binding between TPM and the de-
vice RTM, which we addressed through a TEE-proxy or a
distance bounding protocol. Future work includes a more
detailed and formal write-up of the custom DAA scheme we
used in our prototype, since it is particularly fitting for im-
plementation on a smart card. Also future implementations
of simTPM in industrial IoT or automotive settings for hard-
ware based attestation could be worthwhile to pursue.
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SignSoK(crs,bsn,wi,m):
1. (SIM) Parse the secret key as wi = (sku,A).
2. (SIM) Compute nym← Dsku , where
• D← H0(bsn), if bsn 6=⊥
• D←$ G1, otherwise.
3. (SIM) Choose r ←$ Zp at random and com-
pute R ← Ar (so R = gr/(skiss+sku)1 ). Compute
B = (g1 ·A−sku)r = gr1 ·R−sku (so B = Rskiss ).
4. (SIM) Compute a signature of knowledge
S← SoK{(α,β ) : B =gβ1 ·R−α∧
Dα =nym}(m).
Namely, proceed as follows:
(a) Choose t1, t2←$ Z2p at random and compute
T1← gt21 ·R−t1 and T2← Dt1
(b) (SIM) Create a challenge: c← H(gpk, D, nym, R,
B, T1, T2, m).
(c) (SIM) Compute s1← t1+c ·sku and s2← t2+c ·r.
(d) (SIM) Set S← (c,s1,s2,R,B).
5. The SIM sends S and nym (if bsn=⊥ the it sends also
D) to the Host, who outputs the signature σ = (S,nym)
(in case bsn=⊥ it adds also D to the signature).
VerifySoK(crs,bsn,m,σ):
1. Parse the signature σ = (S,nym) (= (S, nym, D) in
case bsn=⊥).
2. Compute D←H0(bsn) (or in case bsn=⊥ then obtain
D from the signature).
3. Verify the signature of knowledge S:
(a) Parse S as (c, s1, s2,R,B).
(b) Restore the values
T˜1← gs21 ·R−s1 ·B−c .
T˜2← Ds1 ·nym−c .
(c) Check whether
c ?= H(gpk,D,nym,R,B, T˜1, T˜2,m)
and
e(R,gpk) ?= e(B,g2)
If yes, then output 1. Otherwise output 0.
Scheme 3: Direct Anonymous Attestation - Signing/Verifi-
cation
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